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does not, for instance, require the state to
appear completely indifferent before relig-
ion. Mr. Justice Douglas said in his ma-
jority opinion in Zorach that the first
amendment commands:
separation must be complete and unequivo-
cal ... no exception ... absolute. The First
Amendment, however, does not say that in
every and all respects there shall be no con-
cert or union or dependency one on the
other. That is the common sense of the
matter. Otherwise the state and religion
would be aliens to each other - hostile, sus-
picious, and even unfriendly .... We are a
religious people whose institutions presup-
pose a Supreme Being. 70
That is, only in the areas of establish-
ment and freedom of religious pursuit must
the separation be universal; in other areas
the doctrine of sensible accommodation
would allow a realistic degree of contact
without being in violation of the principle
of separation. The Court of Appeals has
held that the Regents Prayer is within the
bounds of permissive accommodation. In
support of New York's position the Su-
premi Court may look to "literally count-
less illustrations . .. that belief and trust
in a Supreme Being was from the beginning
and has been continuously part of the very
essence of the American plan of govern-
ment and society."'" In addition, the Court
may then turn its attention to a judicial
philosophy ratifying noncompulsory non-
sectarian prayers and Bible readings in the
public schools, which antedates the four-
teenth amendment7 2 and which has con-
tinued to the present day a reflection of
predominant sentiments.
70 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-14
(1952).
71 Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 180-81, 176
N.E.2d 579, 581, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661 (1961).
72 Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 61 Am. Dec.
256 (1854). For a comprehensive survey of the
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Recent Decision: Religious Oaths
In Torcaso v. Watkins,' a recent case
before the United States Supreme Court,
petitioner was appointed a notary public
by the Governor of Maryland but the com-
mission was never issued because petitioner
refused to make the following declaration:
"I, Roy R. Torcaso, do declare that I be-
lieve in the existence of God."'2 This dec-
laration was demanded of the petitioner in
order to fulfill the requirement contained in
Article 37 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights that state officers declare their belief
in God.3-The United States Supreme Court,
reversing the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land, held that this "test" for office uncon-
stitutionally invaded "the appellant's free-
dom of belief and religion" and that he was
entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling
the issuance of his commission.
The instant case is the latest chapter in
the history of the test oath, an institution
which appeared on the American scene
before the United States was established.
Religious tests and oaths were part of the
machinery of the established churches
evolution in social, statutory and judicial attitudes
regarding the relationship between church and
public schools, see JOHNSON & YOST, SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE (2d ed. 1948).
1367 U.S. 488 (1961).
2 Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, -, 162 A.2d
438, 440 (1960).
3 Article 37 declares "that no religious test ought
ever to be required as a qualification for any
office of profit or trust in this State, other than
a declaration of belief in the existence of God;
nor shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath
of office than the oath prescribed by this Consti-
tution." (Emphasis added.) The Maryland Court
of Appeals, in Torcaso v. Watkins, supra note
2, at -, 162 A.2d at 441-42, decided that the
word ought was not used in a permissive sense
with regard to belief in God, but that a declara-
tion of such belief was mandatory and required
no legislative enactment to, make it so.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
found in several of the American colonies
prior to the revolution. 4 However, when
the colonies formed the United States they
provided in article VI of the federal consti-
tution that "no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office
or public Trust under the United States." 5
Shortly thereafter, in order to better protect
the religious freedom of the people, the
first amendment to the Constitution was
ratified, providing that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. .... "
In Reynolds v. United States,6 a prosecu-
tion for bigamy, the Supreme Court held
that the first amendment prohibited Con-
gress from regulating religious beliefs, but
did not interfere with the regulation of overt
acts harmful to the state, even if the act
was done in the name of religion.
Both article VI and the first amendment
protected religious freedom from impair-
ment by the federal government, but neither
of them provided such a guarantee with
respect to state, action. This situation was
remedied by the passage of the fourteenth
amendment, the first section of which pro-
vides:
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
In Gitlow v. New York, 7 the Supreme
4 BRADY, CONFUSION TWICE CONFOUNDED 7
(1954), quoting JERNEGAN, THE AMERICAN COL-
ONIEs 350 (1929).
5 See 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES 191-200 (2d ed. 1937).
698 U.S. 145 (1878).
7 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Court assumed that the freedoms of speech
and press protected by the first amendment
are "among the fundamental personal rights
and 'liberties' protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment from
impairment by the States." s Applying this
principle in Schneider v. State,9 some four-
teen years later, the Court found that a law
against soliciting on the public streets vio-
lated these liberties.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,10 the Court
specifically included freedom of religion as
one of the first amendment liberties pro-
tected from state interference by the
fourteenth amendment." The Court held
unconstitutional a statute requiring that
persons soliciting alms for religious causes
obtain a certificate of permission from a
state officer, who would determine whether
the cause was in fact a religious one. The
reasoning of the Court was that such a re-
quirement imposed a prior restraint upon
the exercise of religion, since it allowed a
public officer to determine whether a body
was religious before that body could func-
tion freely.
12
Everson v. Board of Educ.,13 while hold-
ing that the use of public funds to provide
transportation for students of parochial
schools was not a violation of due process
or an establishment of religion, emphasized
that neither the state nor federal govern-
ment can "force [a person] ...to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion. '14 How-
ever, McCollum v. Board of Educ. 15 held
unconstitutional the use of public school
8 Id. at 666.
9 308 U.S. 147,160 (1939).
10 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
11 Id. at 303.
12 Id. at 304.
13330 U.S. 1 (1947).
141d. at 15.
1., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
facilities for religious instruction, on the
ground that such use violated the principles
of freedom of religion and separation of
church and state established in the earlier
cases cited above. Finally, McGowan v.
Maryland,'6 dealing with the validity of
Sunday Closing Laws, stressed the invalid-
ity of such laws if enacted for the purpose
of aiding one -or even all religions. 17 The
laws in question were upheld on the ground
that they were a legitimate exercise of the
police power for the general good. 18
The Court, in the instant case, rendered
its decision in the light of the tradition
established in the above-mentioned cases.
This tradition maintains that the state may
do nothing which aids one or several re-
ligions, or which impairs the rights of any.
Nor may the state do anything which tends
to lessen the religious liberty of any indi-
vidual, subject to the exception that the
state may prohibit action19 obnoxious to
the common welfare, although the practice
in question be done in the name of religion.
16336 U.S. 420 (1961).
'7 Id. at 453.
18 Id. at 444-45.
19 The rule with respect to pure belief not evi-
denced by overt action is that "one be permitted
to believe what he will." American Communica-
tions Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950).
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507-
08 (1951). One early case in the area of religious
belief, Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), up-
held as valid a requirement that those registering
to vote take the following oath: "[A]nd I do
further swear that I am not a bigamist or polyga-
mist; that I am not a member of any order,
organization or association which teaches, ad-
vises, counsels, or encourages its members, dev-
otees, or any other person to commit the crime
of bigamy or polygamy... ; that I do not, and
will not, publicly or privately, or in any manner
whatever, teach, advise, counsel, or encourage
any person to commit the crime of bigamy or
polygamy ..... Id. at 336. This oath appears to
be an attempt to regulate adherence to a belief,
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The Court found that the state was forcing
a person to profess a belief in one religion,
or rather in one type of religion, i.e., theism
in order to be commissioned a public of-
ficer. Although the plaintiff was not forced
to hold office, and therefore was not forced
to profess this belief, if the office is offered
it must be free of any religious requirement.
To enforce such a requirement would be
to unconstitutionally invade "appellant's
freedom of belief and religion. ' 20
In an effort to reinforce its argument
that a declaration such as the one required
in the present case was a violation of con-
stitutionally protected liberty, the Court
pointed out that the adoption of article VI
of the Constitution indicated that test oaths
were repugnant to our national tradition. 21
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in de-
ciding that the Constitution did not forbid
the declaration passed on in the instant
case had emphasized that it would be iron-
ical if an officer empowered to administer
oaths before God were not required to be-
lieve in God.2 2 However, though this is
true, the validity of an oath is not affected
by the fact that the one administering it
does not believe in God. It is the belief of
the person taking the oath that is perti-
nent. 2
3
whether or not that belief is acted upon. To
the extent that the Beason case upholds this at-
tempt, it no longer seems to be a controlling au-
thority in light of the Douds case.
20 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961).
21id. at 491.
22 Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, -, 162 A.2d
438, 443-44 (1960). MD. ANN. CODE art. 68, § 3
(1957) provides that notaries shall have the
power to administer oaths. Article I, § 10 pre-
scribes the form of an oath: "In the presence
of Almighty God I do solemnly promise or de-
clare ..."
23 When article VI was discussed in the North
Carolina Convention on the adoption of the fed-
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The conclusion of the Court in the
instant case with respect to the unconstitu-
tionality of religious test oaths is not star-
tling, especially in view of the clear
prohibition contained in article VI of the
Constitution and the history and tradition
of the United States. However, the sig-
nificance of this case lies not in its conclu-
sion, but rather in certain statements
made by the Court with respect to past
decisions in the area of freedom of religion.
There had been some speculation that the
decision of the Supreme Court in Zorach v.
ClaUSon24 was a retreat from the position
taken in Everson and McCollum. 25 In the
present case the Court emphatically denied
eral constitution, the following remarks were
made by James Iredell, later a Justice of the
United States Supreme Court: "[I]t has been
universally considered that, in administering an
oath, it is only necessary to inquire if the person
who is to take it, believes in a Supreme Being,
and in a future state of rewards and punish-
ments .... It is, however, necessary that such a
belief should be entertained, because otherwise
there would be nothing to bind his conscience
that could be relied on; since there are many
cases where the terror of punishment in this
world for perjury could not be dreaded." 4
ELLIOT, DEBATES 193 (2d ed. 1937).
24 343 U.S. 306 (1952). In that case the Court
held that the Constitution did not prohibit a pro-
gram by which public school students were dis-
missed early in order to attend religious instruc-
tions. There were three dissenting opinions.
25 See Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 688, 191
N.Y.S.2d 453, 485 (Sup. Ct. 1959), afl'd, 11
App. Div. 2d 340, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (2d Dep't
that it had made such a retreat.26 It stated:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither
a State nor the Federal Government can
constitutionally force a "person to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither
can constitutionally pass laws or impose
requirements which aid all religions as
against non-believers, and neither can aid
those religions based on a belief in the
existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs.27
This seems to be a definitive statement of
the law, since there was no dissenting opin-
ion. Two justices, however, merely con-
curred in the result.
Torcaso v. Watkins synthesizes the
American law of religious freedom: the
state shall not aid or inhibit any religion
or the practice thereof. The first amend-
ment considers this freedom from the dual
aspect of establishment of religion and im-
pairment of rights. In practice the two are
often intermingled, as the test oath in the
present case indicates. This declaration both
"establishes" theism and impairs the rights
of the atheist. In the process of deciding
cases concerned with both aspects of the
problem the Supreme Court has evolved
one law: to prevent establishment and pro-
tect free exercise there shall be complete
separation of church and state. This case is
an emphatic reiteration of that doctrine.
1960), afJ'd, 10 N.Y.2d 1010, 176 N.E.2d 579,
218 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1961).
26 Torcaso v. Watkins, supra note 20, at 494-95.
27 Id. at 495.
